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hardening(security): P1 sweep — credential logging, weak hashing, timing attack, fallback identity - #389
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…en comparison, fallback identity
Fixes 7 P1 findings from post-advisory security audit:
1. routes/quizzes.py — remove body fallback identity (3 locations)
identity.get("user_id") or data.get("user_id/wallet_address") allowed
attacker-supplied JSON body to act as identity when JWT absent.
Same root cause as GHSA-p7p9-jc8p-p38m. Now fails to None if no JWT.
2. routes/admin.py:113 — remove credential logging
print(f"Admin auth check - Header: {auth_header}") logged the full
Authorization: Bearer <ADMIN_TOKEN> value on every admin request.
3. routes/admin.py:136 — constant-time token comparison
Replace == with hmac.compare_digest to prevent timing side-channel
on admin token validation.
4. routes/auth.py:264,386 — replace SHA-256 no-salt with werkzeug PBKDF2
hashlib.sha256(password.encode()).hexdigest() has no salt and no
iterations, trivially crackable with GPU/rainbow tables.
Replaced with werkzeug.security.generate_password_hash /
check_password_hash (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, salted, iterated).
Note: existing SHA-256 hashes will fail check; users need password reset.
5. routes/test_flow.py:12 — fix wrong JWT decode secret
Used SECRET_KEY (Flask session secret) instead of JWT_SECRET_KEY.
Legitimate tokens always failed; a token signed with SECRET_KEY passed.
6. routes/dashboard.py — remove X-Wallet-Address from auth documentation
Two strings still advertised the removed header as a supported auth
method, misleading clients and API consumers.
7. frontend/app/admin/login/page.tsx — remove admin token console.log
console.log('Attempting login with token:', adminToken) exposed the
full admin token in browser DevTools on every login attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Post-advisory security hardening sweep. Fixes 7 P1 findings identified after the four main advisories were patched.
Changes
routes/quizzes.py(×3)data.get("user_id")when JWT absent, same root cause as GHSA-p7p9routes/admin.py:113print(Authorization: Bearer <ADMIN_TOKEN>)on every requestroutes/admin.py:136token == expected_tokentiming-attack-vulnerable comparisonhmac.compare_digestroutes/auth.py:264,386hashlib.sha256(password)— no salt, no iterations, GPU-crackablewerkzeug.security.generate_password_hash(PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, salted)routes/test_flow.py:12SECRET_KEYused to decode JWT instead ofJWT_SECRET_KEY— legitimate tokens always failedJWT_SECRET_KEYroutes/dashboard.pyX-Wallet-Addressheader as valid authfrontend/.../admin/login/page.tsxconsole.log('Attempting login with token:', adminToken)in browserExisting users registered before this change have SHA-256 hashed passwords.
check_password_hashwill correctly reject them (SHA-256 hash ≠ PBKDF2 hash). Affected users will need a password reset. No data loss — old hashes remain in DB, just won't verify.Out of scope (separate PRs)
routes/auth.py) — requires DB schema change🤖 Generated with Claude Code