[cherry-pick: release-v0.44.x] fix: prevent unbounded tar layer allocation - #3230
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tekton-robot merged 1 commit intoSep 10, 2026
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Previously, `readTarLayer` used the tar header's declared size directly in `make([]byte, header.Size)`, allowing a malicious bundle to specify an arbitrarily large size and potentially cause the CLI to exhaust available memory and crash. Updated `readTarLayer` to use a bounded reader with a 10 MiB maximum layer size, preventing attacker-controlled tar metadata or oversized layer contents from causing excessive memory allocation. Added regression coverage to verify that layers exceeding the maximum size are rejected. Signed-off-by: Anwesha Palit [apalit@redhat.com] Assisted-by: Claude Opus 4.6
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This is a cherry-pick of #3201
Changes
Previously,
readTarLayerused the tar header's declared size directly inmake([]byte, header.Size), allowing a malicious bundle to specify an arbitrarily large size and potentially cause the CLI to exhaust available memory and crash.Updated
readTarLayerto use a bounded reader with a 1.5 MiB maximum layer size, preventing attacker-controlled tar metadata or oversized layer contents from causing excessive memory allocation. Added regression coverage to verify that layers exceeding the maximum size are rejected.Signed-off-by: Anwesha Palit [apalit@redhat.com]
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 4.6
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