Report privately through GitHub, not in a public issue. Open the repository's Security tab and choose Report a vulnerability. That opens a private advisory visible only to the maintainers.
Please do not open a public issue, pull request, or discussion for a suspected vulnerability until it has been addressed.
A useful report includes:
- What an attacker gains, such as reading a block they should not reach or writing through a handle that should have blocked them.
- The smallest script that shows it, ideally against
InMemoryBackendso it needs no server. - The Genie version or commit, the Python version, and the backend adapter and driver versions if a server is involved.
Genie's security-relevant job is scoped access: deciding which Principal
may perform which operation on which MemoryBlock. Reports about that are in
scope, including:
- Policy bypass — an operation succeeding when the block's
MemoryPolicyshould have raisedAccessDenied. The default isMemoryPolicy.owner_private(), so only the creator canread,write,search,traverse_up, andtraverse_downa new block. - Handle scope escape — reaching a block outside a
MemoryHandleroot, or performing an operation the handle's capabilities exclude. - Leaks through a side channel — search results, traversal, error messages, or hook payloads revealing a block the principal cannot read.
- Injection in a shipped adapter — block ids, types, metadata, keys, or query filters escaping their parameter and altering a SQL statement, a Cypher query, a Mongo command, or a Redis command.
- Recursive delete removing more than it should, beyond the target block and its descendants.
These are design boundaries, not defects. Genie is a library of building blocks, so the application around it owns the rest.
- Genie does not authenticate anyone. The application supplies the
Principal, and Genie trusts it. Proving who the caller is belongs to the application. Memory, backends, policy engines, hook registries, and codec registries are trusted objects. Hand an agent aMemoryHandlerooted at one block, or a tool you wrote yourself. Code that already holds the fullMemoryobject is inside the trust boundary, so reaching further is expected, not a bypass.- A block's policy is chosen when the block is created and never changes. That is deliberate. Requests to add a policy mutation path are a feature discussion, not a vulnerability.
- Search timing.
MemoryQuery.limitcounts visible results, so blocks that the caller cannot see do not change the results. But when many hidden blocks match, a search calls the backend more times. So the time of a search can show that hidden matches exist. - Stored values are the application's concern. Genie does not inspect, validate, or sanitize what you store, and a codec you register runs with the privileges of your process.
- Operational hardening of a database you point an adapter at, such as its authentication, network exposure, and encryption.
- Third-party driver vulnerabilities. Report those upstream. Tell us if Genie's own use of a driver makes an upstream issue reachable when it otherwise would not be.