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Announce hosted rooms on the Statement Store - #119

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knzeng-e merged 31 commits into
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feat/statement-store-room-presence
Aug 3, 2026
Merged

Announce hosted rooms on the Statement Store#119
knzeng-e merged 31 commits into
devfrom
feat/statement-store-room-presence

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@knzeng-e

@knzeng-e knzeng-e commented Jul 31, 2026

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Outcome

Hosted rooms are announced on the Statement Store, so a room can be discovered without Dotify's signaling server. Step 3 of the sequence in #116.

Off by default. Stacked on #118.

The constraint that shaped everything

This is discovery only, and that boundary is load-bearing rather than a limitation I settled for.

A WebRTC offer is 1.5–4 KB against a 512-byte statement ceiling, and the per-account total is 1024 bytes — so a peer cannot hold even one SDP. But the arithmetic is the lesser problem. A guest would have to publish an answer to complete a handshake, and publishing requires an identity and an Individuality allowance.

Moving the join path here would convert every listener into a registered person. That does not degrade the product — it deletes the gesture it exists to protect. So only the host publishes, because the host is already identified, and the share link stays the way in: no wallet, no account, no chain.

Design consequences of the byte budget

One account holds at most two full statements, so naive publishing would exhaust it in a couple of heartbeats.

  • Per-room channel gives last-write-wins, so a hosted room occupies exactly one live statement no matter how often it refreshes.
  • Budget checked against post-write state, so the beacon that would overflow is the one refused. The chain enforces this by silently rejecting the write, which a user experiences as a room that never appears — an explainable local refusal is strictly better.
  • Byte length is authoritative, not character count. A 40-character host name of emoji is 160 bytes; the tests cover that.
  • Optional fields shed first when space runs out, so discovery degrades to "a room exists here" rather than failing to announce.

Privacy is a choice here, not a default

A beacon carries the room code, host display name, and an aggregate listener count — never listener identities.

Now-playing is opt-in per host. A beacon is globally readable and outlives the room by up to the retention window, so publishing what someone is listening to is a materially different exposure than sharing a link with a friend. It stays a deliberate act.

Everything received is re-parsed as untrusted — statements come from arbitrary accounts, so a malformed beacon is dropped rather than allowed to break a discovery list, and remote values are clamped before display.

Host container and cost

Host mode signs through the product's allowance account via the RFC-10 sponsored path, so hosting does not require the listener to hold an Individuality allowance of their own.

The client runs only inside the Product host container, so validateProductionEnvironment rejects VITE_DOTIFY_ROOM_BEACONS=on without a host mode — otherwise the build ships chain code that can never connect.

Build Total bytes
default (off) 4,586,410
VITE_DOTIFY_ROOM_BEACONS=on 4,611,051

Enabling costs ~24 KB. A build with it off still carries a ~69 KB statement-store chunk that is never fetched — Rollup emits a chunk for the nested dynamic import before it can prove the build-time guard makes it unreachable. That is ~1.5% of the bundle and never executes, but I said I would keep it at zero, so it is measured and documented rather than claimed away.

Review guide

  1. web/src/features/rooms/roomBeacon.ts — the encoding and the budget rules.
  2. web/src/features/rooms/roomBeaconPublisher.ts — scope limits and fail-quiet behaviour.
  3. web/src/hooks/useRoomBeacon.ts — kept out of useSession so the room lifecycle stays readable; the ref is written in an effect, not during render.

Verify carefully

  • A beacon can never carry SDP, chat, or listener identities.
  • Now-playing genuinely stays opt-in.
  • A statement-store failure cannot interrupt hosting.
  • The 512 B / 1024 B bounds hold for multi-byte text.
  • Whether the ~69 KB never-fetched chunk is acceptable.

Validation

Evidence Result
cd web && npm run test:unit 269 pass (+32: 17 encoding, 12 publisher, 3 env guard)
cd web && npm run test:signal 49 pass
cd web && npm run lint 0 errors; the 3 pre-existing warnings remain
cd web && npm run build pass — 4.4 MB
cd web && npm run build:product-devnet pass — 4.4 MB
cd web && npm run smoke:production-env pass
node scripts/backlog-sync.mjs --check --offline pass
git diff --check clean

Known limitations and follow-ups

Not exercised against a live Statement Store. Every path is tested through an injected transport; the SDK client cannot run outside a Product host container, so real publish/subscribe evidence needs a run inside the host — the same gate as the rest of the Product work.

Discovery is not yet surfaced in the UI. subscribeRoomBeacons exists and is tested, but nothing renders a discovered-rooms list. That is deliberate: the reading side should land with a real design for how a discovered room is presented, rather than a debug list.

Retention outlives the room. A beacon persists up to the store's retention window after a room closes, so a discovery list must treat entries as hints and confirm liveness on join. Refresh is 30 s against a 90 s TTL, so one missed beat does not drop a room.


Review round: all six comments addressed

Thanks — the two P1s were both real, and the second one would have shipped a visible bug.

[P1] The capability was unreachable through the documented deploy

Correct, and worth stating plainly: .env.product-devnet omitted the flag and deploy:product-devnet always rebuilds in that mode, so the published build announced nothing.

Resolved by keeping it off — but as a deliberate, documented choice rather than an omission. Nothing reads beacons yet, so publishing room records to a public chain would be exposure with no consumer, and the publish path has no live host evidence. Enabling also costs ~24 KB against the Bulletin quota.

  • VITE_DOTIFY_ROOM_BEACONS=off is now explicit in the tracked profile, with the reasoning inline
  • npm run build:product-devnet:beacons / deploy:product-devnet:beacons give the opt-in path
  • deployment-configuration.md carries the selected value and rollback
  • the runbook has a Room Beacons (Dormant By Default) section: prerequisites, enabled-build command, a live evidence procedure that names each failure reason, and rollback

This PR is a dormant capability, not an active outcome.

[P1] Expired rooms were never evicted

You identified the mechanism exactly: the store removes an expired record but sends no deletion event, and BeaconClient was narrowing expiry away.

Expiry is now preserved and decoded (seconds in the upper 32 bits), entries are filtered on read and swept on an interval, onChange fires only when the visible set actually changes, and an already-expired statement is ignored on arrival rather than shown then swept. A transport that omits expiry falls back to an assumed lifetime instead of reintroducing the never-evicting behaviour. Three fake-timer tests cover it.

[P2] The budget check was over-claimed

Scoped honestly rather than defended. The comment now states it sees only this instance's writes. announce returns an outcome: quota-local is named as the per-instance guard, and a network refusal is reported separately as rejected with the account-wide quota called out. The hook logs refusals instead of discarding them. Kept the local check — it catches the one case this instance can cause — but the network is the authority and the code says so.

Naming, and the two code-quality points

Single-letter wire fields are gone: version, listenerCount, title, artist. They cost ~40 bytes of keys against a 512-byte ceiling, which the budget affords, and a wire format gets read by people debugging a live room. Noted in a comment so the trade-off is not silently reversed.

beaconByteLength is now the single measurement entry point, used via a tooLarge() helper. Not snapshotted into one variable, and that is deliberate: every shed step changes the serialized bytes, so a cached length would be stale by the next check. The reasoning is in the comment.

On the OR suggestion — not merged, and the reason is substantive: the two lines delete different fields and each condition must be re-evaluated after the previous deletion, so an OR would drop only one. The duplication you were pointing at is gone anyway, since both now read if (tooLarge(beacon)).

From the review body

  • Hook lifecycle extracted into startRoomBeaconLoop, so start, refresh, cancellation, and the stop-during-connect race are testable as plain logic. Done this way rather than adding a renderer dependency for one file, matching the repo's existing hook-test convention.
  • Roadmap and architecture no longer describe Statement Store presence as proposed.

Re-verified

Evidence Result
npm run test:unit 278 pass (was 269)
npm run test:signal 49 pass
npm run lint 0 errors; 3 pre-existing warnings
npm run build 4,586,370 bytes
VITE_DOTIFY_ROOM_BEACONS=on npm run build:product-devnet 4,611,821 bytes
npm run smoke:production-env pass
node scripts/backlog-sync.mjs --check --offline pass
git diff --check clean

knzeng-e and others added 30 commits July 26, 2026 21:22
The Host signRaw wire format is not pinned by the SDK: HostSignPayloadResponse
carries an untagged signature, and a Substrate host may sign a raw payload
verbatim or inside the conventional <Bytes> envelope. Verification assumed one
shape, so a wrong guess would have failed every Product key request with an
error indistinguishable from a wrong signer.

Accept a bounded set instead: the canonical message verbatim or <Bytes>-wrapped,
and a bare 64-byte or MultiSignature-tagged 65-byte sr25519 signature. Every
variant carries the identical domain-bound message, so this adds no replay,
cross-app, cross-chain, or cross-track surface; a non-sr25519 tag still fails
closed. Route schemas widen to 128 or 130 hex so the tag is checked by the
verifier rather than rejected before it.

Reject EVM-derived account ids for product-sr25519-v1. A 20-byte H160 padded
with 0xee derives back to the H160 it contains, so accepting that shape let a
caller name any paying EVM listener as the requester and rested the boundary on
the curve check alone. A real Product account is a native AccountId32.

A key that parses and derives to the requester but verifies under no variant now
returns PRODUCT_SIGNATURE_REJECTED, kept distinct from SIGNATURE_INVALID so an
envelope problem is separable from a wrong-account problem in logs.

Pin @scure/sr25519 exactly, matching @noble/hashes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wiring the Product key signatures changed the behaviour but three places still
described the old one. The wallet modal told Product-host users that protected
playback required an EVM signer, the runbook asked operators to confirm no key
is released through the Product identity, and the architecture matrix said the
shipped UI used EIP-191 or a session token - contradicted by its own prose two
sections later.

All three now describe what ships: a connected Product account requests
protected keys through product-sr25519-v1, and paid access plus artist
publishing remain on the EVM signer. This matters beyond tidiness - the stale
runbook step would have had an operator sign off on a denial as correct
behaviour, hiding a real signing failure.

Record the signing envelope decision and the EVM-derived key rejection, and turn
the runbook step into an evidence capture that names which envelope the live
host actually produced.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Track and split counts come from contract storage and the directory enumerates
runtimes Dotify does not control, so Array.from({ length: Number(count) })
allocated before anything could reject a malformed or hostile value. Both
adapters now validate counts first and throw rather than truncate, since a
silent cap would present a partial catalog as complete. The catalog loader
already isolates per-runtime failures, so one bad runtime degrades to a missing
artist.

Mark the two unverified spots in the CDM adapter that must be settled before it
can be selected: waitForTransaction returns immediately where the viem writer
awaits a receipt, and the payForAccess value-transfer shape is inferred rather
than confirmed against generated contract types.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dotify has no CDM-registered packages and no `cdm install`, but it does not
need them. Its Solidity contracts are deployed through Asset Hub's eth-rpc,
which is a compatibility layer over pallet-revive - the same pallet the Product
SDK contract helpers target - so the deployed H160 addresses are already
reachable without PolkaVM recompilation or a registry entry.

CdmJsonContract needs only version, address, and abi for getContract(), and
`new ContractManager(...)` is documented as snapshot-only. The generator emits
exactly that snapshot from the same Hardhat artifacts the viem bindings come
from, so the two adapters cannot disagree about an ABI.

Artist runtimes are deliberately absent from the manifest: a diamond is
deployed per artist, so its address is known at call time, not build time, and
a placeholder would misrepresent the deployment. Their merged facet ABI is
emitted separately and bound to an address by createContract.

The generator lives in web/ because it needs the SDK's codegen, which is a
frontend dependency; adding the Product SDK tree to contracts/evm just to emit
types would be a worse trade. Unnamed Solidity getter params are named
positionally for codegen only - generateContractTypes interpolates the name
into a tuple label and emits `args: [: HexString]`, which does not parse. The
manifest ABI stays byte-faithful to the artifact.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements the contract resolver the CDM adapter was missing. Fixed-address
contracts resolve from the generated manifest through ContractManager;
per-artist runtime diamonds bind the merged facet ABI to their call-time
address through createContract.

Two SDK constraints shape this. First, createChainClient routes exclusively
through the Product host provider with no direct-WebSocket fallback, so Product
mode cannot work in a standalone build - validateProductionEnvironment now
rejects product-cdm unless the host mode is enabled. Second, the host decides
which chain an environment resolves to, and Dotify's runtimes live on Polkadot
Hub TestNet, reached through the `paseo` preset rather than `devnet`.
verifyDeployment queries the directory before any catalog read so a wrong-chain
connection fails with a named error instead of looking like artists with no
releases.

Selection is build-time rather than runtime, for two reasons. Switching the
authority for access policy is a deployment decision made with evidence, not
something a page should flip. And Vite inlines the value, so a viem build
tree-shakes the whole Product graph away: 4.4 MB against 10 MB when opted in.
The difference is @parity/product-sdk-descriptors, whose shared descriptors
module references every chain's metadata - only one chunk is ever fetched, but
all are published, and Bulletin storage is a finite quota. Both shipped builds
stay at 4.4 MB.

Reads only. Writes stay on the viem signer path in every mode, because routing
a payment or a publication through a signer with no host transaction evidence
is not a reasonable default. A failed Product setup rejects every read rather
than falling back to viem: the adapter in use must never be ambiguous.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The blocking unknown for Product contract mode is no longer the manifest or
generated types - both now exist and are wired. It is whether the Product host
serves a chain that holds Dotify's runtimes, since the host controls that
mapping and the contracts are on Polkadot Hub TestNet rather than Product
DevNet Asset Hub.

Also records the measured build-size trade-off, so an operator weighs it
against the Bulletin quota before enabling product-cdm for a .dot deployment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous default was wrong in a way that would have produced an empty
catalog. Product DevNet is not a separate network: it is a preset over the
Paseo system parachains - Asset Hub (1000), People (1004), Bulletin (1010) -
at EVM chain 420420417. That is exactly where Dotify is already deployed.

Verified read-only against both endpoints for the ArtistDirectory at
0xcf1534c6e2b0e43b9436c1e86a076466dc0f2108: eth-rpc-testnet.polkadot.io and
paseo-assethub-rpc.laissez-faire.trade both report chain id 0x190f1b41, blocks
one apart, and byte-identical contract code. They are two providers for one
chain, so no contract redeploy is needed to port Dotify to DevNet.

The SDK's `paseo` preset is the trap: it targets Paseo Next (Asset Hub Next
1500 / People Next 1502), which the Product docs call a different network where
"funds sent there will not appear on this Devnet". Dotify has no deployment
there, so ProductChainEnvironment now admits only `devnet` - selecting a chain
that cannot hold the catalog is a bug, not a configuration option.

Also realigns the environment reference tables, clearing the markdownlint
MD060 warnings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Porting Dotify to Product DevNet turned out to be a configuration question
rather than a migration: DevNet is a preset over the Paseo system parachains
(Asset Hub 1000, People 1004, Bulletin 1010) at EVM chain 420420417, which is
where Dotify's contracts already are. This makes that claim checkable instead
of asserted.

`npm run smoke:devnet` reads web/.env.product-devnet and deployments.json and
verifies, read-only, that the configured Asset Hub reports chain 420420417, is
producing blocks past the 2026-07 halt, still serves bytecode for the
ArtistDirectory and ArtistRuntimeFactory, and that the Bulletin RPC and IPFS
gateway respond. It sends no transaction, reads no secret, and prints no
credential. Network-dependent, so it stays out of the unit test path.

The build profile needed no endpoint changes - the configured Bulletin and IPFS
gateway were already the DevNet ones. What it needed was honest comments: the
previous note framed the Asset Hub endpoint as a DevNet-compatible stopgap when
it is in fact the DevNet chain. Adds the second DevNet IPFS gateway as a read
fallback, and a warning against Asset Hub Next (1500) and People Next (1502),
which are a different network holding none of Dotify's contracts.

Verified: 6/6 checks pass against the live chain at head 11546553.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The known-limits bullet still said Product contract mode was blocked on
CDM-installed packages and generated contract types. Both now exist, so the
list overstated what is missing. Only pallet-revive account mapping and
host-signed transaction evidence remain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
fetchIpfsCid and fetchAssetRef walked 4-6 gateways serially with no
per-gateway timeout, so one unresponsive gateway cost the listener the
browser's full connection timeout before the next candidate was tried.
Covers, manifests, and v1 audio all read through that path.

Race the candidates instead, the way audioV2Gateway already does for byte
ranges: bound time-to-headers, hedge onto the next gateway after a delay,
cap concurrency at 3, and abort the losers once a winner answers. Every
URL addresses the same immutable CID, so racing them cannot diverge.

The winner's own controller is never aborted, so its body stays readable,
and a caller abort stops the queue where it is rather than walking the
rest of the list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
min_machines_running = 0 let the API scale to zero, and the first content
key request after an idle period paid the cold start. Measured against the
running deployment: 8.17s to /health cold (uptime 0), 0.11s warm.

That request sits directly in front of first sound, so the saving was
being taken out of the listening experience.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Socket.IO reports a CORS rejection, a stopped server, and a wrong URL
identically, so every one of them surfaced as "Room service unavailable."
That is the vague failure the product invariants rule out, and it hid a
real deployment gap: the running signaling server allows only
muzinga.netlify.app, so opening a room from the Polkadot Product host
origin is refused with a 403 the browser will not explain.

On connect_error, read the server's unauthenticated /health, compare the
page origin against the allowlist it reports, and upgrade the message in
place. The generic reason stands if health cannot be read or if the origin
is allowed, so this only ever widens an error - room access stays decided
by the server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deploying with `flyctl deploy -c services/api/fly.toml` from the repository
root fails at `COPY src ./src`: -c selects the config file, but the build
context stays the shell's working directory, and the Dockerfile is written
against services/api. It also uploads a ~1.3 GB context, because Docker reads
.dockerignore from the context root and only the service directories have one.

A cached `npm ci` layer from an earlier correct build hides the cause, so the
error surfaces at the first uncached step rather than the first wrong one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`makeAttempt` detaches its parent-abort listener as soon as the fetch settles,
which is when headers arrive - before the body has streamed. The winner was
therefore returned already disconnected from the caller's signal, so aborting
afterwards no longer stopped the download.

That is a regression against the serial reader this replaced, which passed the
caller's signal straight to `fetch`. It bites where it matters: `useCatalog`
passes a signal to every audio and asset read, so a listener skipping tracks
left the previous audio downloading to completion, unread.

Re-link the winner to the caller's signal before returning it, and abort the
winner on the late-abort path too - it has already been removed from `active`,
so the cleanup block would not otherwise reach it.

Covered by a regression test that failed before this change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Inside the Product host the app is served from polkadot://app.dotify-test01.dot,
not the DotNS web gateway. SIGNAL_ORIGINS already carried it; API_ORIGINS did
not, so a container would have had working rooms and no content keys - catalog
and key delivery both go to the API, so free and protected playback would fail
CORS while the room layer looked healthy.

Deliberately does not add a bare `null`. `polkadot:` is a non-special scheme, so
its origin is opaque and a browser may send `Origin: null` instead of the
literal value. Allowing that would admit every sandboxed iframe and file:// page
on the web to the authenticated upload and content-key routes. If a host request
is still refused, the actual Origin header from the Fly log is the evidence to
act on. Two regression tests pin both halves: the custom-scheme origin is
answered, a null origin is not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Grounded in the Product docs, SDK reference, and Community Foundation repos
rather than assumption. Three findings drive the proposal.

Dotify is closer to the stack than the roadmap assumed. Its Solidity contracts
already run on pallet-revive via Asset Hub's eth-rpc - the exact pallet the
stack specifies - and app delivery, content addressing, and app-scoped identity
are already on-stack. Its DAV2 encryption is not redundant with a Bulletin move
but the precondition for one, since Bulletin gates storing, not reading.

The genuine gaps are worth closing and mostly make the product better: the
personhood precompile returns a per-app unlinkable alias and would finally make
`human-free` real while retiring the dev registrar; CDM registration makes the
catalog composable by other products; CASH is the asset users actually hold.

One gap will not close. Statement Store writes require an Individuality
allowance, official calls are 1:1 and mobile-only, and an SDP exceeds both the
512-byte statement and 1 KiB per-account ceilings. Moving rooms onto the
official messaging layer would convert every listener into an attested person,
which does not degrade the product - it deletes the gesture it exists to
protect. The anonymous guest is therefore treated as a design constraint, not a
legacy compromise.

Proposes a three-ring architecture that shrinks the trusted core instead of
denying it, and names content-key custody as a stated exception with per-artist
custody as the strongest remedy - turning the most centralized component into an
expression of artist sovereignty.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dotify's `human-free` access mode was gated by an admin registrar that the
runtime initializer sets to the artist. An artist could therefore grant
personhood to their own listeners, which meant the contract could not actually
support the claim the product was making. This replaces that with the
Individuality precompile.

Verified live before writing any of it: the precompile at
0x000000000000000000000000000000000a010000 answers on EVM chain 420420417 -
the chain Dotify is deployed on - returning a 64-byte PersonhoodInfo, where
neighbouring and empty addresses return 0x. The interface is taken from
paseo-network/runtimes, not inferred.

The tiers already lined up: PersonhoodLevel None/DIM1/DIM2 maps by ordinal onto
None/Lite/Full, so no enum or stored track policy changes.

Three properties come out of this. Personhood can no longer be forged by anyone,
including the artist - the setter reverts rather than writing to storage no
access decision reads, because silently accepting it would leave an operator
believing a listener was granted access they do not have. Personhood becomes a
fact about a person rather than per-runtime state, so every runtime reads the
same answer. And the precompile returns a per-context alias, so Dotify can
recognise a distinct person without learning who they are in any other
application - a privacy property the registrar could not offer at all.

Reads use a low-level staticcall on purpose. The precompile declares
HAS_CONTRACT_INFO = false, so its extcodesize can be zero and Solidity's
high-level call would revert on its own extcodesize check. The staticcall also
lets a chain without the precompile resolve to "not live" instead of reverting
every access query, and `live` is surfaced separately so a misconfigured
deployment is not mistaken for an empty user base. Absent precompile denies
every gated track, per the fail-closed invariant.

Tests install mock precompile code at the real address with hardhat_setCode,
which is the only way to exercise both the granted and fail-closed paths on a
chain with no Individuality pallet. Coverage includes tier-below-required,
and personhood held in another application context not unlocking Dotify.

Not deployed. Existing runtimes need a diamond Add cut to gain
musicAccPersonhoodInfo; their access decisions already follow the precompile
without it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`cdm deploy` builds, deploys, publishes metadata, and registers in one pass, so
it cannot be used here: Dotify's contracts are already deployed and already hold
the live catalog. Running it would mint new addresses and orphan every existing
artist runtime.

Reading the registry contract showed the operation that is actually needed is
already exposed. `publishLatest(name, address, metadata_uri)` binds a name to an
arbitrary address, and the contract's own comment states the rule: the caller may
publish only if the name is free or they already own it. So a free name is
claimable directly, no deployment involved. `metadata_uri` is stored verbatim and
never validated.

Adds the `cdm:publish` task for that registration. Read-only by default - it
prints the plan and exact calldata and stops. Registration is first-writer-owns
and the registry exposes no release or transfer entry point, so a claimed name is
permanent; execution therefore requires --confirm and an explicit key, and this
commit claims nothing.

Verified live against the devnet registry at
0x59b0245778917af55224e5f8fb55f7f8d452619f on chain 420420417: all three
@dotify/* names are unclaimed, and both target addresses carry bytecode. Guards
confirmed to fail closed for a wrong registry address and for --confirm without a
key. The task also refuses a target with no bytecode, since publishing a name
that points at nothing is worse than not publishing it.

@dotify/smart-runtime is deliberately not registered: artist runtimes are
per-artist diamonds with no single address, and publishing one artist's runtime
under a shared name would misrepresent the catalog.

Two findings recorded in the architecture doc. CDM's docs independently confirm
the preset distinction this project already encodes - `paseo` is paseo-next
(para 1500), `devnet` is the Paseo testnet Asset Hub (para 1000, chain
420420417). And CDM does support Solidity via a `@custom:cdm` NatSpec tag, which
the architecture page's PolkaVM-only framing hides; Dotify's existing toolchain
is not an obstacle to CDM participation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Redeploying was authorised, since Dotify's on-chain data is test data. That
removes the objection this task was built around, so it was worth checking
whether `cdm deploy` becomes viable. It does not, and the reason is a hard chain
limit rather than a preference.

CDM's Solidity path compiles with resolc to PolkaVM. resolc handles Dotify's
contracts fine - all 24 files compile, including the diamond's delegatecall
fallback and every one of its 17 inline assembly blocks, with only an
informational extcodesize warning. Feasibility is not the blocker.

Size is. The Asset Hub initcode limit is 49,152 bytes and resolc emits roughly
4-10x more bytecode than solc. MusicRegistryPallet, which holds the catalog, is
8,855 bytes as deployed EVM bytecode and 71,252 bytes as a PolkaVM blob - 45%
over the limit. MusicRightsRegistry is 81% over. Clearing it would require
splitting the registry into storage and logic contracts, and the practitioner
report documenting that workaround also records that diamond-style generic
mappings were ineffective at reducing size, which is exactly this architecture.

Asset Hub's pallet-revive accepts both EVM bytecode via eth-rpc and PolkaVM
blobs via resolc. For Dotify the EVM path is not a legacy compromise, it is the
only one that currently fits, and every deployed contract sits comfortably
inside the limit. publishLatest registration is therefore the correct mechanism
rather than a way to avoid redeploying.

Measured, not assumed: resolc 0.6.0 compile in a scratch project, and
eth_getCode against all ten deployed addresses on chain 420420417.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The registry stores (name -> address) and (name -> metadata_uri). Registering
only the first leaves the composability claim nominal: another product can
resolve where Dotify's contracts are but not what they expose, and `cdm install`
fails outright because it requires an ABI in the metadata blob.

Shape is taken from CDM's own consumers rather than guessed. `install.ts`
validates exactly one thing - the blob must be an object whose `abi` is a
non-empty array - and contracts.dot.li additionally renders description, readme,
homepage, repository, license, keywords, authors and published_at. Both are
satisfied; the generated blobs pass that validation, with 11 and 18 ABI entries.

Output is deterministic, which matters for a content-addressed artifact: the same
contracts produce the same bytes and therefore the same CID, so what is published
can always be checked against the repository. `published_at` is omitted by
default for exactly that reason and is opt-in behind --published-at, since a
wall-clock field would mint a new CID on every run. Verified by generating twice
and diffing the CID index.

CIDs are computed locally with the Bulletin SDK (raw codec, blake2b-256), so the
value that goes on-chain is derived from the generated bytes. cdm:publish now
reads that index per package instead of taking one hand-pasted URI for all,
which removes the failure mode where a correct-looking CID is attached to the
wrong contract.

Uploading the blobs to Bulletin needs a storage authorization and stays a
separate credentialed step, documented in the runbook. Nothing is published or
registered by this commit.

Also adds TextEncoder to the eslint script globals, which the existing node
globals list was missing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Product SDK cannot do this upload. `CloudStorageClient.create()` resolves its
chain connection through getChainAPI/createChainClient, both of which route
exclusively through the Product host container with no direct-WebSocket
fallback, so uploading from a terminal is impossible that way. The Bulletin
chain itself accepts a plain signed TransactionStorage.store extrinsic over
WebSocket, which is what this script uses - the same approach the existing
deploy-bulletin.cjs already proved.

Read-only by default. It recomputes every CID from the bytes on disk and refuses
to upload when one drifts from cids.json, because a blob edited after generation
would otherwise land under a CID the registry can never match, and the registry
entry is immutable once published. It also reports the account's remaining
Bulletin quota against what the upload needs, and names the two ways to grant
one when it is short.

Separately fixes a real bug in deploy-bulletin.cjs. Its CID builder tagged the
multihash as 0x1e, which is blake3 - an algorithm the Bulletin Chain does not
accept - while the digest was blake2b-256. The correct code is 0xb220, which is
45600 and needs three varint bytes: 0xa0 0xe4 0x02. So the printed CID, the
gateway URL built from it, and any DotNS registration pointing at it resolved
nowhere. Confirmed by decomposing a CID from @parity/bulletin-sdk: the prefix is
01 55 a0 e4 02 20, and the remaining digest equals getContentHash(bytes, 45600).

Note that script cannot currently run at all - blakejs is not installed in
web/node_modules - which is a separate pre-existing issue and is left alone,
since it serves the legacy single-file Bulletin build.

Nothing is uploaded or registered by this commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Requiring --private-key was wrong on two counts. The repository already
configures an account for polkadotTestnet from the encrypted PRIVATE_KEY
hardhat var, and it is already set, so the flag was redundant. It was also
worse: a key passed on the command line lands in shell history and process
listings, while the var is encrypted at rest. registryUpgrade.ts already used
hre.viem.getWalletClients() for exactly this reason.

The task now resolves the publisher from the network config and keeps
--private-key only as an explicit override for publishing from a different
account than the deployer.

Also makes the stakes visible. publish_latest records `caller` as the permanent
owner of every name it creates, so the signing account owns @dotify/* from then
on - it is not just paying fees. The dry run now prints the resolved publisher
and says so, since that is the last chance to notice before an irreversible
claim.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Rooms become discoverable without Dotify's signaling server. Additive only: a
beacon never carries SDP, ICE, chat, or audio, and is never required to join, so
a share link still works with no wallet, no account, and no chain.

Joining deliberately cannot move here. A WebRTC offer is 1.5-4 KB against a
512-byte statement ceiling, and a guest would have to publish an answer to
complete a handshake, which needs an identity and an allowance. That would turn
every listener into a registered person and delete the gesture the product
exists to protect. Only the host publishes, and the host is already identified.

The byte budget drives the design. MAX_STATEMENT_SIZE is 512 and MAX_USER_TOTAL
is 1024, so one account holds at most two full statements. Beacons are written
to a per-room channel for last-write-wins, otherwise every heartbeat would be a
new statement and the budget would be gone within a couple of beats. The account
total is checked against what would be live after a write, so the overflowing
beacon is the one refused - the chain enforces this by silently rejecting, which
a user experiences as a room that never appears.

Privacy is a deliberate choice, not a default. A beacon carries the room code,
host name, and an aggregate listener count, never listener identities.
Now-playing is opt-in per host, because a beacon is globally readable and
outlives the room by up to the retention window, which is a different exposure
than sharing a link with someone.

Everything received is re-parsed as untrusted: statements come from arbitrary
accounts, so a malformed beacon is dropped rather than allowed to break a
discovery list, and remote values are clamped before display.

Host mode signs through the product's allowance account via the RFC-10 sponsored
path, so hosting does not require the listener to hold an Individuality
allowance. The client runs only inside the Product host container, so the
production guard rejects VITE_DOTIFY_ROOM_BEACONS=on without a host mode rather
than shipping chain code that can never connect.

Off by default. Enabling costs about 24 KB. A build with it off still carries a
~69 KB statement-store chunk that is never fetched, because Rollup emits a chunk
for the nested dynamic import before it can prove the build-time guard makes it
unreachable; that is documented rather than claimed away.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Careful review completed against the PR diff, the exact installed @parity/product-sdk-statement-store@0.6.2 implementation, the existing room lifecycle, and the Product deployment path.

The payload boundary is well scoped: it keeps SDP/ICE/chat/audio out, preserves wallet-free guest joining, validates untrusted JSON, and treats Statement Store failure as additive. Automated evidence also reproduces locally: 269 unit tests pass, 49 signaling tests pass, lint has 0 errors and the 3 existing warnings, git diff --check is clean, and VITE_DOTIFY_ROOM_BEACONS=on npm run build:product-devnet passes.

I would not treat the draft as merge-ready yet because the normal Product build leaves the capability disabled and the reader retains expired rooms indefinitely. I also left an inline note on the account-wide quota claim, which the local map cannot enforce.

Documentation is still out of sync with the architectural change: docs/operations/deployment-configuration.md and docs/operations/product-devnet-deployment.md do not contain the flag, operator prerequisites, enabled-build command, live publish/subscribe smoke, or rollback; web/.env.product-devnet omits the value; and the roadmap/public architecture material still describes Statement Store presence as proposed/future. Per AGENTS.md, this PR changes deployment settings and architecture narrative, so those sources should be updated in the same PR. A focused hook lifecycle test would also close the remaining timer/cancellation coverage gap. Live host evidence can remain a clearly stated draft prerequisite, but the runbook should say exactly how to collect it.

| ------------ | ------------ |
| **Type** | `on` or `off` |
| **Required** | No |
| **Default** | `off` |

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[P1] The standard Product deployment never enables this feature. web/.env.product-devnet does not set VITE_DOTIFY_ROOM_BEACONS, and npm run deploy:product-devnet always rebuilds in product-devnet mode, so the documented deploy command produces the off build and no host ever announces a room. Either enable the flag in the tracked Product profile, or document an explicit opt-in build/deploy command and describe this PR as a dormant capability rather than an active outcome. The selected value and rollback/smoke procedure also belong in docs/operations/deployment-configuration.md and the Product deployment runbook under the repository's env/config rule.

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Addressed. You were right that the documented deploy could never enable this. Resolved by keeping it off but making that a deliberate, documented choice rather than an omission: nothing reads beacons yet, so publishing room records to a public chain would be exposure with no consumer, and the publish path has no live host evidence. VITE_DOTIFY_ROOM_BEACONS=off is now explicit in .env.product-devnet with the reasoning, npm run build:product-devnet:beacons / deploy:product-devnet:beacons provide the opt-in path, and both deployment-configuration.md and the runbook now carry the selected value, prerequisites, enabled-build command, live evidence procedure, and rollback. The PR is described as a dormant capability.

const beacon = parseRoomBeacon(statement.data);
if (!beacon) return;
if (options.roomCode && beacon.room !== options.roomCode.toUpperCase()) return;
seen.set(beacon.room, beacon);

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[P1] Expired statements remain in this map forever. In SDK 0.6.2 the subscription callback includes the statement's expiry, but BeaconClient narrows the callback to { data }, so this listener cannot prune by TTL. The Statement Store removes an expired record; it does not send this code a deletion event. Consequently, after one beacon is received, beacons() and onChange can continue returning that room for the lifetime of the page even if the host stops and the 90-second statement expires. Preserve the expiry metadata, evict records at expiry (and notify onChange), and cover it with a fake-timer test before this is used by discovery UI.

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Fixed, and you identified the mechanism exactly: the store removes an expired record but sends no deletion event, and BeaconClient was narrowing expiry away. Expiry is now preserved and decoded (seconds live in the upper 32 bits), entries are filtered on read and swept on an interval, onChange fires only when the visible set actually changes, and an already-expired statement is ignored on arrival rather than shown then swept. A transport that omits expiry falls back to an assumed lifetime instead of reintroducing the never-evicting behaviour. Three fake-timer tests cover it.

// not what is live now, so the overflowing beacon is the one refused.
const next = new Map(live);
next.set(beacon.room, beacon);
const budget = assertBeaconBudget([...next.values()]);

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[P2] This is not an account-budget preflight. live only knows about successful writes made through this one publisher instance; it cannot see statements from another tab, another Dotify instance, or any other use of the same allowance account. In the shipped hook this publisher owns at most one current room, so the 12-room test exercises a state the app cannot create while real account-wide contention remains invisible. The reason is also discarded and the hook ignores false, so the refusal is not explainable to an operator or user. Please either replace this with account-aware evidence from the host/SDK, or scope it honestly as a per-instance heuristic and add observability for network quota rejection.

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Agreed on all three points, and I have scoped it honestly rather than claiming more.

The comment now states plainly that this only sees writes from this instance and cannot observe another tab, another Dotify instance, or any other use of the same allowance account. announce returns an outcome instead of a bare boolean: quota-local is named as the per-instance guard, and a network refusal is reported separately as rejected, with the account-wide quota called out as the likely cause. The hook logs refusals rather than discarding them, so an operator debugging an undiscoverable room has something to read.

I kept the local check because it does catch the one case this instance can cause, but the network is the authority and the code now says so.

@knzeng-e knzeng-e self-assigned this Jul 31, 2026
@knzeng-e
knzeng-e marked this pull request as ready for review July 31, 2026 05:15
Comment thread web/src/features/rooms/roomBeacon.ts Outdated
/** Host display name, already public to anyone holding the link. */
host: string;
/** Listener count. Aggregate only - never identities. */
n: number;

@knzeng-e knzeng-e Jul 31, 2026

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Better to use meaningful fields/variable names (ex: listenerCount or nbListeners - maybe the first one, to have accurate naming across RoomBeaconInput as well). This should be a rule of thumb

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Agreed, and applied as a rule rather than a one-off: v/n/t/a are now version/listenerCount/title/artist across the type, builder, parser, and tests. The names cost roughly 40 bytes of keys against the 512-byte ceiling, which the budget can afford — and a wire format is read by people debugging a live room, so the saving was not worth the opacity. Noted in a comment so the trade-off is not silently reversed later.

Comment thread web/src/features/rooms/roomBeacon.ts Outdated
Comment on lines +113 to +114
if (byteLength(beacon) > MAX_BEACON_BYTES) delete beacon.a;
if (byteLength(beacon) > MAX_BEACON_BYTES) delete beacon.t;

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Couldn't those two line be rewritten in a single || (OR) conditioned one ?

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Not merged, and I want to explain why rather than just decline. The two lines delete different fields, and each condition must be re-evaluated after the previous deletion — an OR would collapse them into one branch and drop only one field. What I did instead is remove the duplication you were pointing at: both now read if (tooLarge(beacon)), so the repeated measurement expression is gone even though the two statements stay separate.

Comment thread web/src/features/rooms/roomBeacon.ts Outdated
beacon.host = beacon.host.slice(0, Math.floor(beacon.host.length / 2));
}

return byteLength(beacon) <= MAX_BEACON_BYTES ? beacon : null;

@knzeng-e knzeng-e Jul 31, 2026

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we called several times byteLength(beacon) in this code. Maybe worth extract/snapshot it in a single variable at the beginning ? unless this is a dynamic value we need to keep track of ?

Furthermore, why not reusing the beaconByteLength function ?

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Both applied. beaconByteLength is now the single measurement entry point — the call sites use a tooLarge() helper built on it, and assertBeaconBudget uses it too. It is deliberately not snapshotted into one variable: every shed step changes the serialized bytes, so a cached length would be stale by the next check. That reasoning is now in the comment so it does not look like an oversight.

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reviewed

Six review points, plus the documentation gaps called out in the review body.

[P1] The capability was unreachable through the documented deploy.
`.env.product-devnet` omitted the flag and `deploy:product-devnet` always
rebuilds in that mode, so the published build announced nothing. Resolved by
keeping it off but making that explicit and deliberate: nothing reads beacons
yet, so publishing room records to a public chain would be exposure with no
consumer, and the publish path has no live host evidence. The value is now set
in the tracked profile with the reasoning, opt-in build/deploy commands exist,
and deployment-configuration.md plus the runbook carry the selected value,
prerequisites, enabled-build command, live evidence procedure, and rollback.

[P1] The reader never evicted expired rooms. SDK 0.6.2 exposes `expiry` on the
subscription callback, but BeaconClient narrowed it away, and the store removes
an expired record without sending a deletion event - so a stopped room could be
listed for the lifetime of the page. Expiry is now preserved and decoded,
entries are filtered on read and swept on an interval, onChange fires only when
the visible set changes, and an already-expired statement is ignored on arrival.
A transport that omits expiry falls back to an assumed lifetime rather than
reintroducing the never-evicting behaviour.

[P2] The budget check was presented as an account preflight when it can only see
this instance's own writes - not another tab, another instance, or any other use
of the same allowance account. It is now scoped honestly in the comment and in
the type: announce returns a reason, `quota-local` is named as per-instance, and
a network refusal is reported separately as `rejected` with the account-wide
quota called out. The hook logs refusals instead of discarding them, so an
operator debugging an undiscoverable room has something to read.

Naming: single-letter wire fields are replaced with spelled-out names. They cost
about 40 bytes of keys against a 512-byte ceiling, which the budget can afford,
and a wire format is read by people debugging a live room.

Byte measurement is consolidated behind beaconByteLength via a `tooLarge`
helper. It is deliberately not snapshotted: every shed step changes the
serialized bytes, so a cached length would be stale by the next check.

The hook lifecycle is extracted into startRoomBeaconLoop so start, refresh,
cancellation, and the stop-during-connect race are testable as plain logic,
matching the repository's existing hook-test convention rather than adding a
renderer dependency for one file.

Roadmap and architecture no longer describe Statement Store presence as
proposed.

278 tests pass, up from 269.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
@knzeng-e
knzeng-e changed the base branch from feat/cdm-publish-dotify-names to dev August 3, 2026 13:33
@knzeng-e
knzeng-e merged commit 69f5d5a into dev Aug 3, 2026
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