build: pin actions/github-script to commit SHA in pull_request_target workflow#4571
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XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
Closed
build: pin actions/github-script to commit SHA in pull_request_target workflow#4571XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
XananasX7 wants to merge 1 commit into
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SummaryThis PR pins Why this mattersThe FixPinned to the exact commit SHA, with the version annotated as a comment. One-line change, no logic changes. Ready for review. |
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actions/github-script@00f12e3 is not a commit. Closing due to security concerns. |
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Pin
actions/github-scriptto full commit SHA instead of mutablev6tagin the
label-pr.ymlworkflow.This workflow uses
pull_request_targettrigger which runs with writepermissions on every PR from forks. Pinning to SHA ensures immutability
and prevents supply chain attacks via tag manipulation.
Ref: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-third-party-actions