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Description
Security notice: malicious code in Template Playground pull requests
12 November 2026
What happened
Between 22 September and 7 November, one contributor's pull requests to accordproject/template-playground
repeatedly contained hidden, obfuscated JavaScript at the end of postcss.config.js, after a long run of spaces
so it didn't show in most diff views. Because the build loads that file, the code would run on anyone who built
one of those branches.
The code came and went: a push would add it, a later push would remove it. On 7 November, the latest commit on
ten open PRs was rewritten with the code within 30 seconds, keeping each commit's original date. That pattern
points to malware on the contributor's machine rather than something done by hand, so we aren't naming anyone.
We found it on 12 November while working through the PR backlog. The same day we closed the PRs, blocked the
account, reported it to GitHub and took down the affected previews.
What was affected
- None of this code was merged.
main, every release and the live playground are unaffected. Onmain,
postcss.config.jshasn't changed since July 2025. - The account's merged work is clean. Its two merged PRs (template-playground#956 and techdocs#475) don't
contain the code. - CI ran on some of these PRs. Runs for pull requests from forks get a read-only token and no secrets, so we
don't believe anything was exposed. - Deploy previews were built. Netlify built a hosted preview of each infected commit, so the code ran on
Netlify's build servers. The site has no environment variables or secrets, so there was nothing to leak there.
The code runs during the build, not in your browser, and we found no trace of it in the files the previews
served. But we can't fully decode it, so we can't rule out that it changed what the previews served. We have
taken the infected previews down.
The pull requests
template-playground #711, #974, #1019, #1020, #1022, #1033, #1034, #1035, #1054, #1055 and #1056. All are
closed and none was merged.
What you should do
If you only viewed these PRs on GitHub, you don't need to do anything.
If you opened a Netlify preview for any of these PRs (deploy-preview-<number>--ap-template-playground.netlify.app)
since 22 September, the risk is low. As a precaution, if you entered an API key into the playground's AI
settings on a preview, revoke it, and run a malware scan.
If you checked out or ran any of these branches (npm run build, npm test, npm run dev or similar) since
22 September, treat that machine as compromised:
- Disconnect it from sensitive accounts and run a malware scan.
- From a clean device, rotate your GitHub tokens and SSH keys, npm tokens, cloud credentials and any passwords
saved in your browser. Move any crypto wallets used on that machine. - Check your GitHub security log (Settings → Security log) and your own repositories for pushes you didn't
make. - Tell us at security@accordproject.org, so we can check whether anything else was touched.
We haven't decoded the payload in full, so please assume the worst rather than the least.
What we've changed
- Fork PRs: CI on pull requests from forks now waits for a maintainer's approval for all outside
contributors, not only first-time ones. This applies across the Accord Project organisation. - Reviews: we're adding a check to our review guidance and tooling for config files (
*.config.js, build
scripts) with very long lines or code after the end of the file's normal content.
Questions
Ask in the #technology-wg channel on Discord, or reply to this post. If you think you were affected, or want
to report a security issue, email security@accordproject.org.
— Matt Roberts, on behalf of the Accord Project maintainers
Activity
codewithchotu commentedon Nov 18, 2026
hi @mttrbrts! I'd like to take this issue and work on a focused security improvement for Template Playground.
I've put together an initial proposal for a security pipeline covering PR validation, suspicious-code detection, file/change guardrails, least-privilege CI, isolated builds, and gated preview deployments.
My goal would be to first review the existing workflows and the mitigations already introduced, then identify the most relevant improvements and implement them incrementally with tests.
I've attached an initial architecture concept to illustrate my approach. I'd be happy to take ownership of this work if it aligns with the team's priorities. 🙌
mttrbrts commentedon Nov 18, 2026
This would be very welcome @codewithchotu.
The requirement for maintainer approval on all CI does slow down review, and I'm open to relaxing that again where the risks can be managed.
Consider the Netlify preview build, the GitHub Actions workflow, and risk to maintainers building PRs locally in your threat model.
You can also assume that we already use GitHubs Advanced Security tools for Malware detection in dependencies, secret scanning and CodeQL analysis.
Any sensitive findings should be sent to security@accordproject.org first so that we can coordinate disclosure.
Thanks for making a proposal first!
codewithchotu commentedon Nov 19, 2026
Thanks, @mttrbrts ! I really appreciate the guidance.
I'll review the Netlify preview build flow, GitHub Actions workflows, and the risks around maintainers building PRs locally. I'll also take the existing GitHub Advanced Security capabilities into account so we can avoid duplicating protections.
I'll refine the proposal around these areas and focus on a practical, scoped improvement. I'll make sure any sensitive findings are reported to security@accordproject.org first.
Thanks again for the opportunity! Looking forward to contributing.
codewithchotu commentedon Nov 19, 2026
Hi @mttrbrts , I've been reviewing the repository's CI workflows, Playwright setup, and developer documentation.
I've identified that PR workflows execute repository-controlled code during dependency installation, builds, and tests. I also noticed that the developer guide doesn't currently document precautions for building untrusted PRs locally.
I'm exploring a focused addition covering safe local PR builds, alongside the configuration-integrity checks. I couldn't find Netlify preview configuration in the repository, so I'd also appreciate any pointers on how those builds are configured and what protections are already in place.
I'll make sure the proposed changes complement rather than duplicate the existing review tooling.
codewithchotu commentedon Nov 19, 2026
Hi @mttrbrts ,
Just wanted to share a quick update on the configuration integrity checks for issue #1101.
I've implemented the heuristic scanner and integrated it into the PR build, test, and E2E workflows so it runs before dependency installation.
I've also added 22 standalone tests. All 22 pass, the existing 650-test suite passes, and the production build succeeds.
The PR is now open: #1140
I've resolved the DCO check as well. The CI workflows are currently awaiting maintainer approval.
I'd really appreciate your feedback whenever you get a chance. Thanks again for encouraging me to work on this!