[Retest #3751918] Issue title injection still present in agent-triage.yml and agent-fix.yml#2348
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Retest of HackerOne Report #3751918
Retested by: @subchatsecure
Date: 2026-06-26
Verdict: Vulnerability NOT fixed
What I checked
Both agent workflow files were pulled from
mainon 2026-06-26 and compared against the original report.agent-triage.yml — Still Vulnerable
Line 39–40 on current
main:The only change observed is a new proxy content-filter header:
This is not a fix — the root cause (attacker-controlled text interpolated directly into the prompt at the YAML level) is unchanged. A server-side filter does not remove the injection surface.
No
author_associationcheck on thelabeledtrigger path.agent-fix.yml — Still Vulnerable (highest severity, zero changes)
Line 84–85 on current
main:This workflow retains:
contents: write,pull-requests: write,issues: writepermissionsBash(git push -u *),Bash(gh pr *),Bash(GH_TOKEN=* gh pr *)AGENT_PR_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SHOPIFY_GH_ACCESS_TOKEN }}Shopify-Security-Scanheader — not even the partial mitigation from agent-triage.ymlauthor_associationcheck on thelabeledtrigger pathEvidence file
See
RETEST-3751918.mdin this branch for the full side-by-side comparison with proposed correct fix.Conclusion
The reported vulnerability is not fixed. Both workflows continue to inject
${{ github.event.issue.title }}directly into the Claude agent prompt.agent-fix.yml, which has full code write + PR creation access, has received zero changes.