feat(rfq): persist wallet destination catalog

Cargo.toml

@@ -28,10 +28,12 @@ elements = { version = "0.25", features = ["serde"] }
 hex = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }
 hmac = "0.12"
 iroh = "1"
+libc = "0.2"
 postcard = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"] }
 rand = "0.8"
 redb = "4"
 reqwest = { version = "0.13", default-features = false, features = ["json", "rustls", "charset"] }
+rustix = { version = "1", features = ["process"] }
 serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = "1"
 sha2 = "0.10"

README.md

@@ -52,13 +52,18 @@ one canonical signed PSET before returning it. Exact retries replay that
 durable winner without re-signing; concurrently in-flight valid signature
 encodings may both sign, but every caller returns the same stored winner. Its
 `FirmQuote` is still an internal, unauthenticated artifact, not yet a provider-
-signed network quote. The first custom provider-wallet slice adds a versioned
-encrypted keystore, in-memory BIP32/SLIP-77 key derivation, fresh confidential
-tree-less P2TR destinations, output recovery, exact durable-job signing, and a
-provider-side non-last blinding coordinator. It deliberately has no arbitrary
-signing API, and Elements Core remains only the intended chain, mempool, policy,
-and relay authority. Filesystem/passphrase operations, an authoritative
-inventory scanner, daemon and live-regtest integration, backup-recovery tooling,
+signed network quote. The custom provider wallet now adds a versioned encrypted
+keystore, in-memory BIP32/SLIP-77 key derivation, fresh confidential tree-less
+P2TR destinations, output recovery, exact durable-job signing, and a
+provider-side non-last blinding coordinator. Its identity-bound `wallet.redb`
+catalog durably records each random locator before returning a destination,
+publishes new and restored wallets through a same-directory staging file in a
+trusted path hierarchy on a lock-supporting local Unix filesystem, and exports
+an authenticated logical wallet-only snapshot. The naked cryptographic wallet
+deliberately cannot issue production destinations or sign arbitrary data.
+Elements Core remains only the intended chain, mempool, policy, and relay
+authority. Protected passphrase delivery, an authoritative inventory scanner,
+daemon and live-regtest integration, coordinated provider-state recovery,
 market-data pricing, the authenticated remote protocol, relay reconciliation,
 and HSM support remain future work. [ADR 0008](docs/adr/0008-rfq-service-owned-wallet.md)
 records that boundary.

crates/deadcat-rfq-wallet/Cargo.toml

@@ -16,7 +16,13 @@ deadcat-rfq-provider.workspace = true
 elements.workspace = true
 hmac.workspace = true
 rand.workspace = true
+redb.workspace = true
 sha2.workspace = true
 subtle.workspace = true
+tempfile.workspace = true
 thiserror.workspace = true
 zeroize.workspace = true
+
+[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
+libc.workspace = true
+rustix.workspace = true

crates/deadcat-rfq-wallet/src/keystore.rs

@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ impl EncryptedKeystore {
         Self::seal_entropy_with_rng(identity, passphrase, kdf, &entropy, rng)
     }
 
-    fn seal_entropy_with_rng<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
+    pub(crate) fn seal_entropy_with_rng<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
         identity: ProviderIdentity,
         passphrase: &[u8],
         kdf: KdfParams,

crates/deadcat-rfq-wallet/src/lib.rs

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 //! Narrow, purpose-built hot-wallet capabilities for an RFQ provider.
 //!
-//! This crate owns no chain index. It provides a versioned encrypted keystore
-//! envelope, fresh confidential tree-less P2TR destinations,
-//! confidential-output recovery, and exact durable-job signing. The envelope
-//! bytes can be copied and reopened, but a production daemon must still supply
-//! atomic filesystem persistence, protected passphrase delivery,
-//! authoritative chain scanning, and tested backup transport and verification.
+//! This crate owns no chain index. It provides a versioned encrypted keystore,
+//! an identity-bound durable locator catalog, fresh confidential tree-less
+//! P2TR destinations, confidential-output recovery, and exact durable-job
+//! signing. A production daemon must still supply protected passphrase
+//! delivery, authoritative chain scanning, coordinated service backup, and
+//! host-level memory hardening.
 //!
 //! Secret buffers owned here are erased on drop where their underlying type
 //! permits it. This is defense in depth, not a claim that Rust temporaries,
@@ -16,7 +16,12 @@
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 
 mod keystore;
+mod persistent;
 mod wallet;
 
 pub use keystore::{DEFAULT_KDF_PARAMS, EncryptedKeystore, KdfParams, KeystoreError, UnlockedSeed};
+pub use persistent::{
+    MAX_WALLET_CATALOG_ENTRIES, PersistentRfqWallet, PersistentWalletError, WalletBackup,
+    WalletCatalogSnapshot,
+};
 pub use wallet::{RfqWallet, RfqWalletError};