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ae5518a
fix: HF inference prefix not sent to client; mixed-case prefix and tests
Feb 22, 2026
1ec89f4
fix affected tests
Feb 22, 2026
a6dbe30
merge upstream/main: resolve conflicts preferring upstream (except HF)
cursoragent Feb 22, 2026
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6 changes: 0 additions & 6 deletions CHANGELOG.md
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Expand Up @@ -6,8 +6,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai

### Changes

- Skills: remove bundled `food-order` skill from this repo; manage/install it from ClawHub instead.
- Docs/Subagents: make thread-bound session guidance channel-first instead of Discord-specific, and list thread-supporting channels explicitly. (#23589) Thanks @osolmaz.
- Channels/Config: unify channel preview streaming config handling with a shared resolver and canonical migration path.
- Discord/Allowlist: canonicalize resolved Discord allowlist names to IDs and split resolution flow for clearer fail-closed behavior.
- Memory/FTS: add Korean stop-word filtering and particle-aware keyword extraction (including mixed Korean/English stems) for query expansion in FTS-only search mode. (#18899) Thanks @ruypang.
Expand All @@ -21,9 +19,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai

### Fixes

- Gateway/Subagents: guard gateway and subagent session-key/message trim paths against undefined inputs to prevent early `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'trim')` crashes during subagent spawn and wait flows.
- Agents/Workspace: guard `resolveUserPath` against undefined/null input to prevent `Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'trim')` crashes when workspace paths are missing in embedded runner flows.
- Auth/Profiles: keep active `cooldownUntil`/`disabledUntil` windows immutable across retries so mid-window failures cannot extend recovery indefinitely; only recompute a backoff window after the previous deadline has expired. This resolves cron/inbound retry loops that could trap gateways until manual `usageStats` cleanup. (#23516, #23536) Thanks @arosstale.
- Channels/Security: fail closed on missing provider group policy config by defaulting runtime group policy to `allowlist` (instead of inheriting `channels.defaults.groupPolicy`) when `channels.<provider>` is absent across message channels, and align runtime + security warnings/docs to the same fallback behavior (Slack, Discord, iMessage, Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal, LINE, Matrix, Mattermost, Google Chat, IRC, Nextcloud Talk, Feishu, and Zalo user flows; plus Discord message/native-command paths). (#23367) Thanks @bmendonca3.
- Gateway/Onboarding: harden remote gateway onboarding defaults and guidance by defaulting discovered direct URLs to `wss://`, rejecting insecure non-loopback `ws://` targets in onboarding validation, and expanding remote-security remediation messaging across gateway client/call/doctor flows. (#23476) Thanks @bmendonca3.
- CLI/Sessions: pass the configured sessions directory when resolving transcript paths in `agentCommand`, so custom `session.store` locations resume sessions reliably. Thanks @davidrudduck.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -142,7 +137,6 @@ Docs: https://docs.openclaw.ai

### Fixes

- Agents/Bootstrap: skip malformed bootstrap files with missing/invalid paths instead of crashing agent sessions; hooks using `filePath` (or non-string `path`) are skipped with a warning. (#22693, #22698) Thanks @arosstale.
- Security/Agents: cap embedded Pi runner outer retry loop with a higher profile-aware dynamic limit (32-160 attempts) and return an explicit `retry_limit` error payload when retries never converge, preventing unbounded internal retry cycles (`GHSA-76m6-pj3w-v7mf`).
- Telegram: detect duplicate bot-token ownership across Telegram accounts at startup/status time, mark secondary accounts as not configured with an explicit fix message, and block duplicate account startup before polling to avoid endless `getUpdates` conflict loops.
- Agents/Tool images: include source filenames in `agents/tool-images` resize logs so compression events can be traced back to specific files.
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion docs/experiments/plans/pty-process-supervision.md
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Expand Up @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Unit tests:
E2E targets:

- `pnpm test:e2e src/agents/cli-runner.e2e.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run src/agents/bash-tools.exec.pty-fallback.test.ts src/agents/bash-tools.exec.background-abort.test.ts src/agents/bash-tools.process.send-keys.test.ts`
- `pnpm test:e2e src/agents/bash-tools.exec.pty-fallback.e2e.test.ts src/agents/bash-tools.exec.background-abort.e2e.test.ts src/agents/bash-tools.process.send-keys.e2e.test.ts`

Typecheck note:

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55 changes: 27 additions & 28 deletions docs/gateway/security/index.md
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Expand Up @@ -117,34 +117,33 @@ When the audit prints findings, treat this as a priority order:

High-signal `checkId` values you will most likely see in real deployments (not exhaustive):

| `checkId` | Severity | Why it matters | Primary fix key/path | Auto-fix |
| -------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- |
| `fs.state_dir.perms_world_writable` | critical | Other users/processes can modify full OpenClaw state | filesystem perms on `~/.openclaw` | yes |
| `fs.config.perms_writable` | critical | Others can change auth/tool policy/config | filesystem perms on `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` | yes |
| `fs.config.perms_world_readable` | critical | Config can expose tokens/settings | filesystem perms on config file | yes |
| `gateway.bind_no_auth` | critical | Remote bind without shared secret | `gateway.bind`, `gateway.auth.*` | no |
| `gateway.loopback_no_auth` | critical | Reverse-proxied loopback may become unauthenticated | `gateway.auth.*`, proxy setup | no |
| `gateway.http.no_auth` | warn/critical | Gateway HTTP APIs reachable with `auth.mode="none"` | `gateway.auth.mode`, `gateway.http.endpoints.*` | no |
| `gateway.tools_invoke_http.dangerous_allow` | warn/critical | Re-enables dangerous tools over HTTP API | `gateway.tools.allow` | no |
| `gateway.nodes.allow_commands_dangerous` | warn/critical | Enables high-impact node commands (camera/screen/contacts/calendar/SMS) | `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` | no |
| `gateway.tailscale_funnel` | critical | Public internet exposure | `gateway.tailscale.mode` | no |
| `gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth` | warn | Insecure-auth compatibility toggle enabled | `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth` | no |
| `gateway.control_ui.device_auth_disabled` | critical | Disables device identity check | `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth` | no |
| `gateway.real_ip_fallback_enabled` | warn/critical | Trusting `X-Real-IP` fallback can enable source-IP spoofing via proxy misconfig | `gateway.allowRealIpFallback`, `gateway.trustedProxies` | no |
| `discovery.mdns_full_mode` | warn/critical | mDNS full mode advertises `cliPath`/`sshPort` metadata on local network | `discovery.mdns.mode`, `gateway.bind` | no |
| `config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags` | warn | Any insecure/dangerous debug flags enabled | multiple keys (see finding detail) | no |
| `hooks.token_too_short` | warn | Easier brute force on hook ingress | `hooks.token` | no |
| `hooks.request_session_key_enabled` | warn/critical | External caller can choose sessionKey | `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey` | no |
| `hooks.request_session_key_prefixes_missing` | warn/critical | No bound on external session key shapes | `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` | no |
| `logging.redact_off` | warn | Sensitive values leak to logs/status | `logging.redactSensitive` | yes |
| `sandbox.docker_config_mode_off` | warn | Sandbox Docker config present but inactive | `agents.*.sandbox.mode` | no |
| `tools.exec.host_sandbox_no_sandbox_defaults` | warn | `exec host=sandbox` resolves to host exec when sandbox is off | `tools.exec.host`, `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode` | no |
| `tools.exec.host_sandbox_no_sandbox_agents` | warn | Per-agent `exec host=sandbox` resolves to host exec when sandbox is off | `agents.list[].tools.exec.host`, `agents.list[].sandbox.mode` | no |
| `tools.exec.safe_bins_interpreter_unprofiled` | warn | Interpreter/runtime bins in `safeBins` without explicit profiles broaden exec risk | `tools.exec.safeBins`, `tools.exec.safeBinProfiles`, `agents.list[].tools.exec.*` | no |
| `security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs` | critical/warn | Open groups can reach command/file tools without sandbox/workspace guards | `channels.*.groupPolicy`, `tools.profile/deny`, `tools.fs.workspaceOnly`, `agents.*.sandbox.mode` | no |
| `tools.profile_minimal_overridden` | warn | Agent overrides bypass global minimal profile | `agents.list[].tools.profile` | no |
| `plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy` | warn | Extension tools reachable in permissive contexts | `tools.profile` + tool allow/deny | no |
| `models.small_params` | critical/info | Small models + unsafe tool surfaces raise injection risk | model choice + sandbox/tool policy | no |
| `checkId` | Severity | Why it matters | Primary fix key/path | Auto-fix |
| -------------------------------------------------- | ------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- |
| `fs.state_dir.perms_world_writable` | critical | Other users/processes can modify full OpenClaw state | filesystem perms on `~/.openclaw` | yes |
| `fs.config.perms_writable` | critical | Others can change auth/tool policy/config | filesystem perms on `~/.openclaw/openclaw.json` | yes |
| `fs.config.perms_world_readable` | critical | Config can expose tokens/settings | filesystem perms on config file | yes |
| `gateway.bind_no_auth` | critical | Remote bind without shared secret | `gateway.bind`, `gateway.auth.*` | no |
| `gateway.loopback_no_auth` | critical | Reverse-proxied loopback may become unauthenticated | `gateway.auth.*`, proxy setup | no |
| `gateway.http.no_auth` | warn/critical | Gateway HTTP APIs reachable with `auth.mode="none"` | `gateway.auth.mode`, `gateway.http.endpoints.*` | no |
| `gateway.tools_invoke_http.dangerous_allow` | warn/critical | Re-enables dangerous tools over HTTP API | `gateway.tools.allow` | no |
| `gateway.nodes.allow_commands_dangerous` | warn/critical | Enables high-impact node commands (camera/screen/contacts/calendar/SMS) | `gateway.nodes.allowCommands` | no |
| `gateway.tailscale_funnel` | critical | Public internet exposure | `gateway.tailscale.mode` | no |
| `gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth` | warn | Insecure-auth compatibility toggle enabled | `gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth` | no |
| `gateway.control_ui.device_auth_disabled` | critical | Disables device identity check | `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth` | no |
| `gateway.real_ip_fallback_enabled` | warn/critical | Trusting `X-Real-IP` fallback can enable source-IP spoofing via proxy misconfig | `gateway.allowRealIpFallback`, `gateway.trustedProxies` | no |
| `discovery.mdns_full_mode` | warn/critical | mDNS full mode advertises `cliPath`/`sshPort` metadata on local network | `discovery.mdns.mode`, `gateway.bind` | no |
| `config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags` | warn | Any insecure/dangerous debug flags enabled | multiple keys (see finding detail) | no |
| `hooks.token_too_short` | warn | Easier brute force on hook ingress | `hooks.token` | no |
| `hooks.request_session_key_enabled` | warn/critical | External caller can choose sessionKey | `hooks.allowRequestSessionKey` | no |
| `hooks.request_session_key_prefixes_missing` | warn/critical | No bound on external session key shapes | `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes` | no |
| `logging.redact_off` | warn | Sensitive values leak to logs/status | `logging.redactSensitive` | yes |
| `sandbox.docker_config_mode_off` | warn | Sandbox Docker config present but inactive | `agents.*.sandbox.mode` | no |
| `tools.exec.host_sandbox_no_sandbox_defaults` | warn | `exec host=sandbox` resolves to host exec when sandbox is off | `tools.exec.host`, `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode` | no |
| `tools.exec.host_sandbox_no_sandbox_agents` | warn | Per-agent `exec host=sandbox` resolves to host exec when sandbox is off | `agents.list[].tools.exec.host`, `agents.list[].sandbox.mode` | no |
| `security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs` | critical/warn | Open groups can reach command/file tools without sandbox/workspace guards | `channels.*.groupPolicy`, `tools.profile/deny`, `tools.fs.workspaceOnly`, `agents.*.sandbox.mode` | no |
| `tools.profile_minimal_overridden` | warn | Agent overrides bypass global minimal profile | `agents.list[].tools.profile` | no |
| `plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy` | warn | Extension tools reachable in permissive contexts | `tools.profile` + tool allow/deny | no |
| `models.small_params` | critical/info | Small models + unsafe tool surfaces raise injection risk | model choice + sandbox/tool policy | no |

## Control UI over HTTP

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2 changes: 0 additions & 2 deletions docs/tools/exec-approvals.md
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Expand Up @@ -184,8 +184,6 @@ Configuration location:
- `safeBins` comes from config (`tools.exec.safeBins` or per-agent `agents.list[].tools.exec.safeBins`).
- `safeBinProfiles` comes from config (`tools.exec.safeBinProfiles` or per-agent `agents.list[].tools.exec.safeBinProfiles`). Per-agent profile keys override global keys.
- allowlist entries live in host-local `~/.openclaw/exec-approvals.json` under `agents.<id>.allowlist` (or via Control UI / `openclaw approvals allowlist ...`).
- `openclaw security audit` warns with `tools.exec.safe_bins_interpreter_unprofiled` when interpreter/runtime bins appear in `safeBins` without explicit profiles.
- `openclaw doctor --fix` can scaffold missing custom `safeBinProfiles.<bin>` entries as `{}` (review and tighten afterward). Interpreter/runtime bins are not auto-scaffolded.

Custom profile example:

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