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8 changes: 8 additions & 0 deletions 2.0/0x300-Integrations/0x303-I3-Oracle.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ Category “I3” lists requirements related to the Oracle smart contract as one
| **I3.4** | Verify that, when using Uniswap V3 TWAP as price oracle, liquidity is high enough and is distributed widely across most of the price range. |
| **I3.5** | Verify that, the use a decentralized off-chain oracles unsusceptible to on-chain price manipulation attacks (e.g. Chainlink) is considered for low liquidity asset, ideally combining it with on-chain oracles to detect malicious values. |
| **I3.6** | Verify that the value you are using has had enough time to be reported as invalid and has not been. |
| **I3.7** | Verify that there is a check for stale prices when using Chainlink Oracle |
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| **I3.8** | Verify that there is a check for down l2 sequencer when using Chainlink Oracle |
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| **I3.9** | Verify that NOT the same heartbeat is used for multiple price feeds when using Chainlink Oracle |
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| **I3.10** | Verify that the code deals with different price feeds having different decimal precision when using Chainlink Oracle |
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| **I3.11** | Verify that the price feed address wherever it is located(hardcoded, deployment script) is pointing to the correct oracle price feed |
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| **I3.12** | Verify that the code handles calls to the oracle if they potentially revert when using Chainlink Oracle |
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Do you mean a situation when call to price feed reverts? If so, what is the risk? The whole tx would revert right?

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Hey @CDSecurity, just a quick reminder. Can you elaborate on that?

| **I3.13** | Verify that the code handles the situation when oracle returns incorrect price during flash crashes when using Chainlink Oracle |
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## References

Expand All @@ -32,3 +39,4 @@ For more information, see also:
* [So you want to use a price oracle](https://samczsun.com/so-you-want-to-use-a-price-oracle/)
* [Pricing LP tokens | Warp Finance hack](https://cmichel.io/pricing-lp-tokens/)
* [Uniswap V3 tick price manipulation](https://medium.com/@hacxyk/we-rescued-4m-from-rari-capital-but-was-it-worth-it-39366d4d1812)
* [Chainlink Oracle Considerations](https://medium.com/cyfrin/chainlink-oracle-defi-attacks-93b6cb6541bf)