10-auth-server.yaml

# Embedded OAuth authorization server: MCP clients OAuth against the
# GATEWAY itself, with no pre-shared tokens.
#
# The gateway serves RFC 8414 metadata, JWKS, RFC 7591 dynamic client
# registration, /authorize (PKCE required), and /token. A client like
# Claude Code discovers all of it from the 401 challenge and runs the
# browser flow.
#
# With `upstream` set, login federates to your company IdP: the user
# authenticates there, the gateway issues its own (ES256) access token for
# the MCP session, and KEEPS the upstream tokens. Backends with
# `auth: upstream_swap`-style needs can reuse them (see swap note below).
#
# Without `upstream`, /authorize auto-approves a local dev identity and
# logs a warning. Dev only.

listen: 127.0.0.1:8000

# inbound.mode has no effect when auth_server is set: the gateway
# validates its own issued tokens.
inbound:
  mode: anonymous

auth_server:
  issuer: http://127.0.0.1:8000        # external URL of this gateway
  signing_key_file: ${HOME}/.mcpproxy/authserver.pem   # generated if absent
  access_token_ttl: 1h
  upstream:                            # federate login to a company IdP
    issuer: https://accounts.google.com
    client_id: ${IDP_CLIENT_ID}
    client_secret: ${IDP_CLIENT_SECRET}
    scopes: ["openid", "email", "profile"]

backends:
  everything:
    transport: stdio
    command: ["npx", "-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-everything"]

# Upstream-swap: a backend can reuse the caller's stored upstream IdP token
# as its outbound credential, so the user's own identity reaches the MCP
# server. You wire it in code when embedding
# (authserver.NewUpstreamSwapSource); daemon-level YAML wiring is on the
# roadmap.