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PHASES.md

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Development phases

Historical completion claims were withdrawn by the forensic audit. Presence of a module or a passing mock round trip is not protocol completion.

Phase Work Status
1 Planning and Architecture Revised foundation; continuing
2 Post-Quantum Cryptography Not implemented; unsafe mocks removed
3 IKEv2 Foundation Partial: bounded parser and isolated key-schedule arithmetic
4 IPsec/ESP Foundation Partial: AES-GCM packet primitive and local lifecycle; no gateway
5 CLI and Monitoring Partial: config, capabilities, laboratory benchmark
6 Benchmarking and Stress Testing Partial: ESP benchmarks; no tunnel stress test
6.5 Protocol Correctness and Cryptographic Hardening Partial; authenticated IKE and interoperability gates open
7 Standards-Oriented Hybrid PQ/T IKEv2 Planned; architecture documented
8 Quantum Key Infrastructure / QKD Provider Planned; blocked by Phase 6.5 gates
9 Hybrid Key Composition and Crypto-Agility Planned
10 Quantum-Safe Network Daemon Planned
11 Multi-Site Quantum-Safe Fabric Planned
12 Hardware QKD Interoperability Lab Planned

Next gates, in order

  1. Review packet hardening and perform independent ESP interoperability/vector validation; sustain fuzzing.
  2. Implement a small authenticated IKE profile, complete identity/transcript binding, proposal/selector verification, retransmission/SPI/message-ID semantics and CHILD_SA tests against an independent peer.
  3. Select and audit standardized ML-KEM/ML-DSA providers; verify known-answer tests, key validation, implicit rejection, error propagation and secret lifetimes. Never alias legacy Kyber/Dilithium implementations as standardized algorithms.
  4. Implement RFC 9242/9370 intermediate transcript and sequential key updates, checking the ML-KEM IKE specification status again before coding negotiation.
  5. Only then implement QKD provider, emulator, bounded response parser and pools; follow with explicit downgrade policy and transactional QKD-aware rekey.
  6. Add runtime ownership, observability, scale tests, then hardware interoperability.

No later phase is complete. QKD and a daemon must not obscure an unauthenticated control plane.