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HIP 40: Validator Denylist

  • Author(s): @BFGNeil, @Anthonyra, @ElonTusk
  • Start Date: 2021-09-27
  • Category: Economic, Technical
  • Original HIP PR: helium#284
  • Tracking Issue: helium#285
  • Status: In Discussion

Summary and Motivation

While the situation with regards to Proof-of-Coverage gaming has improved and additional enhancements are intended, we need a backstop prevention mechanism that allows us to quickly allow the network to grow and deal with obvious gaming and spoofing situations as they materialize.

This plan proposes that validators would maintain a denylist file of Hotspot addresses which are selected from a basic floor function, selecting the hotspots where earnings are abnormal, and then this is likey followed up with more metrics (see unresolved questions)

This proposal has two consensus mechanisms:

  1. How hotspots are added or removed from the denylist.
  2. Whether validators choose to adopt the community denylist.

Semi-Detailed Implementation Plan

  • A public JSON or YAML file of denylisted Hotspot unique addresses will be included in the validator software

  • When PoC transactions are submitted to the consensus group, if a supermajority (66.6%) of consensus group members agree that a given Hotspot address is on the denylist, any witness receipts from that address will be marked as invalid with a reason of denylist

  • Only witness receipts are affected by the denylist. Hotspots on the denylist can still transmit and be witnessed by others, and be rewarded for that activity. This also allows Hotspots to justify being removed from the denylist in the future

  • Validators do not have to use the community denylist file or any denylist at all. Only if a supermajority (66.6%) of consensus group members both have a denylist and have common Hotspots on the denylist would any action be taken. This puts consensus decision making in the hands of a) the entity that approves/denies pull requests to the community denylist, and b) validators who choose whether to adopt the denylist.

  • To prevent the abuse of this reporting system there needs to be a minimum set of requirements that need to be met before a case can be considered for investigation. The first suggested minimum requirement is around the amount of HNT the accused miner is being rewarded in a 24 hour period. If this amount is greater than the average HNT rewarded to a hotspot in a 24hr period times 14 days it can be flagged for investigation.

  • Hotspots selected by this floor can be seen here: https://etl.dewi.org/public/question/54f5138b-b7ec-47c7-9da3-6a8c94ffe0eb

  • Community members will be able to submit pull requests against this file to remove addresses from the list with some explanation for the request. A chosen party will review (who exactly is unanswered)

  • Hotspots chosen by the selected party to be added, will be given a notice period where they can submit an issue to appeal the denylist before it happens. This notice should be public, giving owners a chance to appeal, with the outcome of the appeal also being made public.

Open Questions

  • Who decides which denylist PR's to accept or reject?

  • Do hotspots earn challengee rewards?

  • What other methods if any should be applied to this basic floor to help define gamed hotspots vs legitimate coverage

  • How often is the deny list updated?

  • How often is this list checked for hotspots returning to normal function, and removal, or is this only done via an appeal process?

  • Does this committee have the power to choose hotspots out of the scope of this floor on earnings, as an emergency procedure?

Success Metrics

Success here means that a hotspot address contained on a majority of validators' denylist have their PoC witness receipts rejected as invalid.