diff --git a/cheatsheets/REST_Assessment_Cheat_Sheet.md b/cheatsheets/REST_Assessment_Cheat_Sheet.md
index d4f24d2e78..dd4da9fd50 100644
--- a/cheatsheets/REST_Assessment_Cheat_Sheet.md
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@@ -62,7 +62,129 @@ Analyzing collected requests to optimize [fuzzing](https://owasp.org/www-communi
 
 Lastly, when [fuzzing](https://owasp.org/www-community/Fuzzing), don't forget to emulate the authentication mechanism used.
 
+## Assessing OpenAPI/Swagger-based REST APIs
+
+Modern REST APIs are commonly described using the [OpenAPI Specification (OAS)](https://www.openapis.org/), which replaces older formats such as WSDL and WADL. When an OpenAPI definition is available it significantly accelerates attack surface discovery.
+
+**Locate the schema document.** Common default paths include:
+
+- `/openapi.json`, `/openapi.yaml`
+- `/swagger.json`, `/swagger.yaml`
+- `/api-docs`, `/v2/api-docs`, `/v3/api-docs`
+- `/docs`, `/redoc`
+
+Even when these paths are not advertised, try them — many frameworks expose them by default in production.
+
+**Enumerate endpoints and parameters from the schema.** The schema lists every path, HTTP method, query parameter, request body field, and response shape. Use this to:
+
+- Build a complete list of endpoints that may not appear in the UI.
+- Identify parameters that the client never sends but the server still accepts.
+- Find endpoints marked `deprecated` that may receive less security scrutiny.
+
+**Test undocumented fields.** Schemas can lag behind implementation. Submit additional JSON fields beyond those defined in the schema and observe whether they are accepted or reflected in responses — this is the basis for [Mass Assignment](#mass-assignment-in-json-apis) testing.
+
+**Schema-driven fuzzing.** Tools such as [OWASP ZAP](https://www.zaproxy.org/) and [Schemathesis](https://schemathesis.readthedocs.io/) can import an OpenAPI definition and automatically generate test cases for each endpoint, including boundary values, type mismatches, and required-field omissions.
+
+## JWT and OAuth2 Assessment
+
+Many modern REST APIs use [JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)](https://jwt.io/) for stateless authentication and [OAuth 2.0](https://oauth.net/2/) for delegated authorization. Misconfigurations in either are a frequent source of critical vulnerabilities.
+
+### JWT Assessment
+
+**Verify signature validation.** Swap the algorithm header to `alg: none` and remove the signature. A vulnerable server will accept the token without validating it.
+
+**Test algorithm confusion.** If the server uses RS256 (asymmetric), try signing the token with HS256 using the server's *public key* as the HMAC secret. Servers that do not pin the expected algorithm may accept the forged token.
+
+**Tamper with claims.** Decode the payload (it is Base64Url-encoded, not encrypted), modify claims such as `sub`, `role`, or `email`, re-sign or strip the signature, and replay the token.
+
+**Check expiry enforcement.** Send a token whose `exp` claim is in the past. The server should return `401`; if it returns `200`, expiry is not being validated.
+
+**Inspect the payload for sensitive data.** JWT payloads are readable by anyone who holds the token. Look for PII, internal identifiers, or role information that should not be client-visible.
+
+**Test `kid` header injection.** If the server resolves a signing key by a `kid` (key ID) header value, test for SQL injection, path traversal, and SSRF via that field.
+
+For comprehensive JWT attack guidance see the [OWASP JSON Web Token Cheat Sheet](JSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheet.md).
+
+### OAuth2 Assessment
+
+**Validate scope enforcement.** Obtain a token with a limited scope (e.g. `read:profile`) and attempt operations that require broader scope (e.g. `write:admin`). The server should reject out-of-scope requests with `403`.
+
+**Test token reuse across tenants.** In multi-tenant APIs, use a valid token issued to Tenant A and attempt to access resources belonging to Tenant B.
+
+**Check PKCE enforcement.** For authorization code flows, confirm that [PKCE](https://oauth.net/2/pkce/) (`code_challenge` / `code_verifier`) is required. Without it, a stolen authorization code can be exchanged for a token.
+
+**Attempt refresh token misuse.** Test whether refresh tokens can be used more than once (they should be rotated and invalidated on use) and whether they expire.
+
+## Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA)
+
+[BOLA](https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0xa1-broken-object-level-authorization/) (also known as IDOR — Insecure Direct Object Reference) is the most common API vulnerability in the [OWASP API Security Top 10](https://owasp.org/API-Security/).
+
+**Identify object identifiers in requests.** Look for numeric IDs, UUIDs, slugs, or hashes in URL path segments and query parameters:
+
+```
+GET /api/v1/orders/4821
+GET /api/v1/users/7/documents/99
+```
+
+**Horizontal privilege escalation.** Authenticate as User A, capture the identifier for one of User A's resources, then substitute the identifier for a resource belonging to User B. If the server returns User B's data, BOLA is present.
+
+**Vertical privilege escalation.** Substitute identifiers for objects belonging to a higher-privilege user (e.g. an administrator record) using a low-privilege token.
+
+**Test all HTTP methods.** An endpoint that correctly restricts `GET` on another user's resource may still permit `PUT`, `PATCH`, or `DELETE` on it.
+
+**Test indirect references.** Some APIs replace direct database IDs with hashed or encoded identifiers. Attempt to decode or enumerate these — predictable schemes (sequential integers encoded in Base64, for example) can still be exploited.
+
+## Mass Assignment in JSON APIs
+
+Mass assignment occurs when an API automatically binds request body fields to internal object properties without filtering, allowing attackers to set fields the application never intended to expose — such as `role`, `isAdmin`, or `balance`.
+
+**Identify bindable fields.** Compare the fields documented in the API schema against the fields present in the response body. Undocumented response fields are candidates for assignment testing.
+
+**Inject extra fields in `POST` and `PUT` requests.** Add fields beyond those shown in the documentation:
+
+```json
+{
+  "name": "Alice",
+  "email": "alice@example.com",
+  "role": "admin",
+  "isVerified": true
+}
+```
+
+Inspect the response and any subsequent `GET` requests for that resource to determine whether the injected fields were persisted.
+
+**Target numeric privilege escalation fields.** Fields such as `credits`, `balance`, `quota`, or `subscriptionTier` are high-value targets. Attempt to set them to arbitrarily large values.
+
+**Test `PATCH` separately.** Partial-update endpoints may apply mass assignment independently of full-update `PUT` endpoints.
+
+## Rate Limiting and Throttling Assessment
+
+APIs that do not enforce rate limits are vulnerable to credential stuffing, enumeration, denial-of-service, and scraping attacks.
+
+**Establish a baseline.** Send a sequence of identical requests and note response time, headers, and status codes. Look for standard rate-limiting headers:
+
+- `X-RateLimit-Limit` — the request ceiling
+- `X-RateLimit-Remaining` — requests remaining in the current window
+- `X-RateLimit-Reset` — Unix timestamp when the window resets
+- `Retry-After` — seconds to wait after a `429` response
+
+**Exceed the limit.** Send enough requests to exhaust the documented limit and confirm the API returns `429 Too Many Requests`. A `200` response after the limit is exceeded indicates rate limiting is not enforced.
+
+**Test per-resource limits separately.** Authentication endpoints (login, password reset, OTP verification) should have stricter limits than general data endpoints. Test each independently.
+
+**Attempt limit bypass.** Try the following bypass techniques and observe whether the limit resets or is circumvented:
+
+- Rotating `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` header values.
+- Distributing requests across multiple API keys or accounts.
+- Using different HTTP methods (`GET` vs `POST`) for the same logical operation.
+
+**Test for missing limits on sensitive operations.** Enumeration attacks against user IDs, coupon codes, OTPs, and similar finite spaces are often feasible even at low request rates if no limit is applied. Test these explicitly.
+
 ## Related Resources
 
 - [REST Security Cheat Sheet](REST_Security_Cheat_Sheet.md) - the other side of this cheat sheet
+- [OWASP API Security Top 10](https://owasp.org/API-Security/)
+- [OWASP JSON Web Token Cheat Sheet](JSON_Web_Token_for_Java_Cheat_Sheet.md)
+- [OWASP OAuth 2.0 Cheat Sheet](OAuth2_Cheat_Sheet.md)
+- [Schemathesis — OpenAPI fuzzing tool](https://schemathesis.readthedocs.io/)
 - [YouTube: RESTful services, web security blind spot](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWq4qGLAZHI) - a video presentation elaborating on most of the topics on this cheat sheet.