π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal in video upload API#141
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Path Traversal in video upload API#141Cukurikik wants to merge 1 commit into
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Sanitized the user-provided `file.name` using `path.basename()` before writing to the local `/tmp/omni/video` directory to prevent directory traversal attacks (e.g., `../../../../etc/passwd`). Co-authored-by: Cukurikik <[email protected]>
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. π βΉοΈ Recent review infoβοΈ Run configurationConfiguration used: defaults Review profile: CHILL Plan: Pro Run ID: π Files selected for processing (2)
π WalkthroughWalkthroughA path traversal vulnerability in the video upload API endpoint has been addressed. A Sentinel security entry documents the risk, and the POST handler now sanitizes uploaded filenames using Changes
Estimated code review effortπ― 2 (Simple) | β±οΈ ~8 minutes Poem
π₯ Pre-merge checks | β 2 | β 1β Failed checks (1 warning)
β Passed checks (2 passed)
βοΈ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings. β¨ Finishing Touchesπ Generate docstrings
π§ͺ Generate unit tests (beta)
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Path Traversal in the
/api/video/[tool]/route.tsendpoint allowed an attacker to supply afile.namecontaining directory traversal segments (e.g.,../../../etc/passwd), permitting arbitrary file write outside the/tmp/omni/videodirectory.π― Impact: An attacker could potentially write arbitrary files to the server's filesystem.
π§ Fix: Sanitized the user-provided
file.nameusingpath.basename()to securely extract only the intended file name, and safely constructed the path usingpath.join().β Verification: Ran unit tests and validated file uploads locally using a PoC script showing that traversed filenames are correctly stripped to base names. Recorded learning in
.jules/sentinel.md.PR created automatically by Jules for task 16489355823253958809 started by @Cukurikik
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